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I. INTRODUCTION
U.S. law on securities fraud, particularly insider trading, is a common
law creation constructed with federal courts’ interpretations and applications
of Rule 10b-5.1 Since O’Hagan,2 so is outsider trading.3 Rule 10b-5 was
* Assistant Professor of Business Law, Marist College School of Management. BA, Trinity
College; MA, New York University; JD, Northwestern University School of Law. The author thanks
primary discussant Prof. Robert Prentice and other commentators for their constructive criticism and
suggestions in the 2020 American Business Law Journal Invited Scholars Colloquium. All proposals,
assertions, and errors in the article remain the author’s.
1. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2011) (“It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, . . .
[t]o employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, . . . or . . . [t]o engage in any act, practice, or
course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security.”).
2. United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997).
3. See generally, Thomas M. Madden, O’Hagan, 10b5-2, Relationships and Duties, 4 HASTINGS
BUS. L.J. 55 (2008). By “outsider trading”, I mean actions found in violation of SEC rules promulgated
under Section 10(b) which actions are not premised on a fiduciary relationship owed by the securities
trading party to the issuer of those securities nor to that issuer’s stockholders. Outsider trading is premised

[29]
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promulgated by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC or
Commission) under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 19344
(Section 10(b)) is the Commission’s primary anti-fraud provision governing
securities transactions. Since the 1968 Texas Gulf Sulfer5 decision, the
Second Circuit, perhaps as much as the U.S. Supreme Court, has articulated
and adopted theories of insider and outsider trading. No such theory has been
more contentious than the misappropriation theory as codified by the

on the fraud on the source version of the misappropriation theory adopted in Justice Ginsburg’s majority
opinion in O’Hagan.
4. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2010). It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use
of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any facility of any national
securities exchange, (a) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, (b) to make any untrue
statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements
made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or (c) to engage in
any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any
person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
5. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968) (establishing the disclose or
abstain rule).
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Commission in Rules 10b5-16 and 10b5-27 subsequent to the Supreme
Court’s adoption of fraud-on-the-source misappropriation in the 1997
O’Hagan decision.8

6. Rule 10b5-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1 (2021). Trading “On the Basis Of” Material Nonpublic
Information in Insider Trading Cases.
Preliminary Note to Rule 10b5-1: This provision defines when a purchase or sale constitutes trading
“on the basis of” material nonpublic information in insider trading cases brought under Section 10(b) of
the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 thereunder. The law of insider trading is otherwise defined by judicial
opinions construing Rule 10b-5, and Rule 10b5-1 does not modify the scope of insider trading law in any
other respect.
(a) General. The “manipulative and deceptive devices” prohibited by Section 10(b) of the
Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 thereunder include, among other things, the purchase or sale of
a security of any issuer, on the basis of material nonpublic information about that security or
issuer, in breach of a duty of trust or confidence that is owed directly, indirectly, or derivatively,
to the issuer of that security or the shareholders of that issuer, or to any other person who is the
source of the material nonpublic information.
(b) Definition of “On the Basis Of.” Subject to the affirmative defenses in paragraph (c) of this
Rule 10b5-1, a purchase or sale of a security of an issuer is “on the basis of” material nonpublic
information about that security or issuer if the person making the purchase or sale was aware
of the material nonpublic information when the person made the purchase or sale.
(c) Affirmative Defenses.
(1) (i) Subject to paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Rule 10b5-1, a person’s purchase or sale is not “on
the basis of” material nonpublic information if the person making the purchase or sale
demonstrates that:
(A) Before becoming aware of the information, the person had:
(1) Entered into a binding contract to purchase or sell the security,
(2) Instructed another person to purchase or sell the security for the instructing person’s
account, or
(3) Adopted a written plan for trading securities;
(B) The contract, instruction, or plan described in paragraph (c)(1)(i)(A):
(1) Specified the amount of securities to be purchased or sold and the price at which and the
date on which the securities were to be purchased or sold;
(2) Included a written formula or algorithm, or computer program, for determining the amount
of securities to be purchased or sold and the price at which and the date on which the securities
were to be purchased or sold; or
(3) Did not permit the person to exercise any subsequent influence over how, when, or whether
to effect purchases or sales; provided, in addition, that any other person who, pursuant to the
contract, instruction, or plan, did exercise such influence must not have been aware of the
material nonpublic information when doing so; and
(C) The purchase or sale that occurred was pursuant to the contract, instruction, or plan. A
Purchase or sale is not “pursuant to a contract, instruction, or plan” if, among other things, the
person who entered into the contract, instruction, or plan to purchase or sell securities (whether
by changing the amount, price, or timing of the purchase or sale), or entered into or altered a
corresponding or hedging transaction or position with respect to those securities.
(ii) Paragraph (c)(1)(i) of this Rule 10b5-1 is applicable only when the contract, instruction, or
plan to purchase or sell securities was given or entered into in good faith and not as part of a
plan or scheme to evade the prohibitions of this Rule 10b5-1.
(iii) This subparagraph defines certain terms as used in paragraph (c).
(A) Amount. “Amount” means either a specified number of shares of other securities or a
specified dollar value of securities.
(B) Price. “Price” means the market price on a particular date or a limit price, or a particular
dollar price.
(C) Date. “Date” means, in the case of a market order, the specific day of the year on which
the order is to be executed (or as soon thereafter as is practicable under ordinary principles of
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Since O’Hagan, the misappropriation theory and its codification in
2000 in Rules 10b5-1 and 10b5-2 has remained underutilized, if not
controversial. Why? The core of critiques and discussions on the topic
ultimately center on the concept of fiduciary duty.9 The federal courts have
failed to adequately elucidate the proper role of fiduciary duty in the federal
common law of insider, and now outsider, trading nearly twenty years after
the Commission’s promulgation of Rules 10b5-1 and 10b5-2; rules intended
to settle broadly recognized incongruity surrounding the role.10
best execution). “Date” means, in the case of a limit order, a day of the year on which the limit
order is in force.
(2) A person other than a natural person also may demonstrate that a purchase or sale of
securities is not “on the basis of” material nonpublic information if the person demonstrates
that:
(i) The individual making the investment decision on behalf of the person to purchase or sell
the securities was not aware of the information; and
(ii) The person had implemented reasonable policies and procedures, taking into consideration
the nature of the person’s business, to ensure that individuals making investment decisions
would not violate the laws prohibiting trading on the basis of material nonpublic information.
These policies and procedures may include those that restrict any purchase, sale, and causing
any purchase or sale of any security as to which the person has material nonpublic information,
or those that prevent such individuals from becoming aware of such information.
7. Rule 10b5-2, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-2 (2021). Duties of Trust or Confidence in Misappropriation
Insider Trading Cases. Preliminary Note to Rule 10b5-2: This Rule 10b5-2 provides a nonexclusive
definition of circumstances in which a person has a duty of trust or confidence for purposes of the
“misappropriation” theory of insider trading under Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5.
The law of insider trading is otherwise defined by judicial opinions construing Rule 10b-5, and Rule
10b5-2 does not modify the scope of insider trading law in any other respect.
(a) Scope of Rule. This Rule 10b5-2 shall apply to any violation of Section 10(b) of the
Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 thereunder that is based on the purchase or sale of securities on
the basis of, or the communication of, material nonpublic information misappropriated in
breach of a duty of trust or confidence.
(b) Enumerated “Duties of Trust or Confidence.” For purposes of this Rule 10b5-2, a “duty of
trust or confidence” exists in the following circumstances, among others:
(1) Whenever a person agrees to maintain information in confidence;
(2) Whenever the person communicating the material nonpublic information and the person to
whom it is communicated have a history, pattern, or practice of sharing confidences, such that
the recipient of the information knows or reasonably should know that the person
communicating the material nonpublic information expects that the recipient will maintain its
confidentiality; or
(3) Whenever a person receives or obtains material nonpublic information from his or her
spouse, parent, child, or sibling; provided, however, that the person receiving or obtaining the
information may demonstrate that no duty of trust or confidence existed with respect to the
information, by establishing that he or she neither knew nor reasonably should have known
that the person who was the source of the information expected that the person would keep the
information confidential, because of the parties’ history, pattern, or practice of sharing and
maintaining confidences, and because there was no agreement or understanding to maintain
the confidentiality of the information.
8. See generally, Thomas M. Madden, O’Hagan, 10b5-2, Relationships and Duties, 4 HASTINGS
BUS. L.J. 55 (2008).
9. See generally, Alan Strudler & Eric W. Orts, Moral Principle in the Law of Insider Trading,
TEX. L. REV. (1999) and Donna Nagy, Insider Trading and the Gradual Demise of Fiduciary Principles,
94 IOWA L. REV. 1315 (2009).
10. See, e.g., SEC v. Cuban, 634 F. Supp. 2d 713, 729-31 (N.D. Tex. 2009), vacated and remanded,
620 F.3d 551 (5th Cir. 2010). See Robert A. Prentice, Permanently Reviving the Temporary Insider, 36
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The conundrum this article addresses is the still unclear, still shifting
federal courts’ understanding of the meaning and role of fiduciary duty under
Section 10(b), and how it relates and whether it is synonymous with the “duty
of trust or confidence” addressed in Rules 10b5-1 and 10b5-2 and the federal
case law interpreting those rules.11 It builds on earlier work seeking to
examine what use the Commission has made of Rule 10b5-2.12
Part II of this work frames the current milieu of federal court decisions
addressing the fiduciary duty conundrum and its associated applications or
disregard of Rules 10b5-1 and 10b5-2 (with necessary reference to earlier
precedent under Rule 10b-5). Part III, fleshes out the concept of fiduciary
duty under Section 10(b), noting its role at the heart of common law
securities fraud. Part IV, proposes that modifying and better employing Rule
10b5-2 would help to clarify the fiduciary conundrum under Section 10(b)
and would be instrumental in doing away with the common law’s misnomers
and confusion.

II. SECURITIES FRAUD, FEDERAL COURTS, AND FIDUCIARY
DUTY
Prior to O’Hagan and Rules 10b5-1 and 10b5-2, common law
explication of insider trading under Section 10(b), at least since Dirks,13 if
not Chiarella,14 was generally explicitly premised on the breach of a
fiduciary duty. This is distinguishable from the Commission’s earlier abstain
or disclose approach to securities fraud set out in Cady Roberts15, also known
as the parity-of-information approach.16

IOWA J. CORP. L. 343 (2011) (addressing, inter alia, the role of Rule 10b5-2 in SEC v. Cuban). See also,
John C. Coffee, Jr., Symposium: The Past, Present, and Future of Insider Trading Law: A 50th
Anniversary Re-Examination of Cady, Roberts and the Revolution It Began; Mapping the Future of
Insider Trading Law: Of Boundaries, Gaps and Strategies, 2013 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 281 (2013)
(addressing the common law of insider trading through the element of deception and proposing Rules
10b5-3 and 10b5-4).
11. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Exchange Act Release No. 7881 (Aug. 15, 2000); 17
C.F.R. 240, 243, 249 (2011); 17 C.F.R. 240.10b5-1 and 10b5-2 (2011). See generally Madden, supra note
2, at 72-75 (assessing the lack of use or recognition of Rule 10b5-2 in the federal courts).
12. Id.
13. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 653-54 (1983) (holding that an officer of a broker-dealer who
learned of fraudulent accounting in a corporation and informed clients who traded on the basis of that
information in securities of the fraud committing corporation owed no fiduciary duty to shareholders of
the fraud committing corporation in whose stock the clients traded).
14. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 227-30 (1980) (holding that a financial printer
employee who learned of forthcoming securities transactions owed no fiduciary duty or similar duty of
trust and confidence to his employer printer clients and had no duty to disclose the information he learned
of from the printer’s clients, which information motivated his securities trades in issuers involved in the
forthcoming transactions).
15. In re Cady, Roberts & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 6668, 40 SEC Docket 907 (Nov. 8, 1961).
16. See Donald C. Langevoort, Fine Distinctions in the Contemporary Law of Insider Trading, 2013
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 429, 432 (2013) (discussing the transition from SEC Chairman Carey’s influence
on defining insider trading to Justice Powell’s influence via Chiarella and Dirks) and see generally
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In both Chiarella and Dirks, Justice Powell was explicit and repetitive
in using the words “fiduciary duty,” setting out what became known as the
“classical theory” of insider trading, itself a misnomer in place of securities
fraud.17 Justice Powell built upon his previous discussion of relationships
giving rise to duties of trust and confidence in Chiarella and constructed in
Dirks his general fiduciary breach framework, which he apparently
envisioned would control future anti-fraud actions brought under Rule 10b5.18 In so doing, Powell had perhaps the greatest personal impact on
establishing federal law on insider trading.
A.C. Pritchard has documented Justice Powell’s conscious, careful
construction of a federal fiduciary principle that both contained the
expansion of Section 10(b) and, for the time being, warded off the Court’s
adoption of the misappropriation theory.19 It is clear that Powell did this
expressly to avoid a chilling effect on securities analyst information digging,
assessment, and reward – pointedly rejecting the earlier parity-ofinformation approach to insider trading and focusing instead on relationship
characteristics that would give rise to a duty.20 Powell sought to construct a
justifying principle that could control future insider trading cases while not
dissuading market research and earned advantage.21 Yet, the adopted
principle, a federal fiduciary duty, has proven both vexing and difficult to
apply consistently to subsequent trading scenarios. Indeed, several scholars
have concluded that the very notion of emphasizing fiduciary duty in the
common law of insider trading was a contrivance.22
A.

POWELL’S CLASSICAL THEORY FIDUCIARY DUTY
Fiduciary duty is generally defined as a “duty to act for someone else’s
benefit, while subordinating one’s personal interests to that of the other
Donald C. Langevoort, Insider Trading and the Fiduciary Principle: A Post-Chiarella Review, 70 CALIF.
L. REV. 1 (1982).
17. See Nagy, supra note 9, at 1326 (“Justice Powell invoked the term “fiduciary” a total of seven
times in Chiarella’s majority opinion.”).
18. See A.C. Pritchard, Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., and the Counterrevolution in the Federal
Securities Laws, 52 DUKE L.J. 841, 933 (2003).
19. Id.
20. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 658 (“Imposing a duty to disclose or abstain solely because a person
knowingly receives material nonpublic information from an insider and trades on it could have an
inhibiting influence on the role of market analysts, which the SEC itself recognizes is necessary to the
preservation of a healthy market.”); see also, Pritchard, supra note 18, at 937-941.
21. Pritchard, supra note 18, at 937-41.
22. See Nagy, supra note 9, at 1337-40 (discussing “fiduciary fictions” and noting that insider
trading actually turns on the “wrongful use of confidential information”). See also Coffee, supra note
10, at 289-90 (discussing Dirks as a product of its time . . .), Prentice, supra note 10, at 345 (“Obviously,
insider trading law is a work in progress. Because Congress and the SEC have declined to promulgate a
specific, thorough definition of insider trading, it has been left to the courts to define it on the fly. Insider
trading law should be fleshed out in accordance with a reasonable understanding of relevant policy
considerations.”); and Langevoort, supra note 16, at 440 (writing of insider trading that “[i]t is not really
fraud, even though we have chosen to call it fraud in order to preserve and embellish the useful message
of investor protection.”).
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person. It is the highest standard of duty implied by law (e.g., trustee,
guardian).”23 It may be that Powell misused the fiduciary duty concept in the
securities anti-fraud context – largely as a result of the need to fill a void in
the common law construction of insider trading. While Powell and the
classical theory depend upon the breach of a known duty described as
fiduciary duty, that duty may not actually refer to a true fiduciary standard.
More accurately, as subsequent courts have opined, it may refer to a
“fiduciary-like” relationship.24 Herein lies the conundrum.
In the context of tipping as in Dirks, Justice Powell’s version of the
breach of fiduciary duty under Section 10(b) has two parts. First, a
relationship giving rise to a duty must exist.25 (This duty is owed to the
shareholders of a corporation whose stock is to be traded and the duty may
be inherited by a tippee.)26 Second, the trader (often tippee) must know or
should know of both the duty and its breach (the tippee inheriting or deriving
the duty of the tipper).27 That knowledge, or would-be knowledge, (i) must
include the existence of a personal benefit to the tipper in tipping the tippee
and (ii) that personal benefit must be either (a) of a pecuniary nature or (b)
in the nature of the benefit of gift giving.28 In the Dirks Court’s words, “. . .
a tippee assumes a fiduciary duty to the shareholders of a corporation not to
trade on material nonpublic information only when the insider has breached
his fiduciary duty to the shareholders by disclosing the information to the
tippee and the tippee knows or should know that there has been a breach.”29
After finding the duty, the determination turns on “whether the insider
receives a direct or indirect personal benefit from the disclosure, such as a
pecuniary gain or a reputational benefit that will translate into future
earnings”30
“. . . [T]here may be a relationship between the insider and the recipient
that suggests a quid pro quo from the latter, or an intention to benefit the
particular recipient. The elements of fiduciary duty and exploitation of
nonpublic information also exist when an insider makes a gift of
confidential information to a trading relative or friend. The tip and trade
resemble trading by the insider himself followed by a gift of the profits to
the recipient.”31

23. Fiduciary Duty, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 625 (6th ed. 1990).
24. See, e.g., United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 567 (2d Cir. 1991) (employing the term to
refer to the relationship at issue under Rule 10b-5).
25. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 660-61.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 663.
28. Id.; See Langevoort, supra note 16 at 447-448. See also, Donna M. Nagy, Beyond Dirks:
Gratuitous Tipping and Insider Trading, 42 J. CORP. L. 1, 3-4 (2016).
29. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 660.
30. Id. at 663 (emphasis added).
31. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 664.
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This less than crystal clear writing has left subsequent courts to sort out
what fiduciary duty really means in the securities fraud context, and whether
the “personal benefit test” applied to determine the purpose of inside
information disclosure and resultant breach of that duty requires that a tipper
will at least share in profits via a tippee’s trade.32 Though the underlying
breach of fiduciary duty is named, the Court’s surrounding verbiage is
cloudy and in no way explicit. The Court’s language ranges from “elements”
or qualities, to duties “like” fiduciary duties.
Powell’s actual discussion concerning the definition and nature of
fiduciary duty was quite limited in Dirks.33 His focus was rather on the
purpose of disclosure in determining breach of the duty and, ultimately,
deception.34 In looking to Chiarella and Cady Roberts, Powell summarily
adopted the fiduciary requirement without expounding on it.35 Tellingly,
however, he quoted language from Chiarella holding that a breach of
fiduciary duty cannot exist where the party trading on the inside information
“was not a fiduciary, [or] was not a person in whom the sellers [of the
securities] had placed their trust and confidence.”36 In fact, Powell’s version
of fiduciary duty may, in practice, be more akin to Rule 10b5-2’s codification
of duties of trust or confidence – which clearly established a lower threshold
than a true fiduciary relationship of one bound to act in the best interest of
another.37 Yet, at the very least, Powell’s version does require the finding of
a relationship of trust and confidence. The conundrum leads us to wonder,
why all the fuss on the fiduciary terminology when the actual focus appears
to be on a duty of trust or confidence that can exist outside of strict fiduciary
relationships obligating one party to act in the best interest of another.
1.

Subsequent Decisions Looking to Powell’s Fiduciary Duty
Since Dirks, the cloudiness surrounding Powell’s fiduciary duty
appears to be, at least in part, due to the U.S. Supreme Court’s failure to
clearly elucidate what defines fiduciary duty in the securities fraud context,
or what characteristics of such a duty matter in finding deception or fraud
under Section 10(b). The problem is that subsequent decisions by federal
circuit and federal district courts have almost continually looked back to
Dirks to resolve the issue. Of course, this looking back is necessary due to
our common law system of precedent. In this instance, the precedent is
problematic because Dirks simply did not give us functional clarity.
Moreover, the federal courts’ almost inescapable lack of accuracy and
consistency in embracing and applying the fiduciary duty concept that has
32. See generally Donald C. Langevoort, Informational Cronyism, 69 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 37, 4043 (2016).
33. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 660.
34. Id. at 662.
35. Id. at 654.
36. Id. (citing Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 232.) (emphasis added).
37. See infra Part II.C.
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resulted since Dirks, has only grown more puzzling as judge after judge has
genuinely attempted to make sense of the fiduciary conundrum.38
Again, a fiduciary relationship is characterized by a one-way obligation
born by the fiduciary to act in the best interest of another. This is the sort of
overt, proactive duty that is not simply one of either unidirectional or
reciprocal trust and confidence. Yet, in reality, it certainly and logically
appears that Powell’s real concern with fiduciary duty was in fact with a
relationship of trust and confidence, not a one-way duty of an agent to act in
the best interest of a principal or beneficiary.
The federal court that confronted this reality most directly was the
Northern District of California in United States v. Joon Kim.39 In Kim, the
Northern District of California looked to the Second Circuit’s 1991
Chestman40 decision that informed, and in large part motivated, the
Commission’s adoption of Rule 10b5-2. Kim attended to the Chestman
court’s discussion of a similar relationship of trust and confidence in addition
to a fiduciary relationship per se.41 This expansion was not, however,
intended in a broad sense. Rather, the similar relationship of trust and
confidence was explicitly considered in the sense of a “functional
equivalent” to fiduciary duty.42 Kim expounded and reiterated that the
relationship at issue was defined by one side being superior to the other, and
repeated the need to find “superiority, dominance and control.”43 Thus, the
Kim court refused to find the existence of such a duty among members of a
CEO club, though those members regularly shared confidential information,
because those members shared as equals.44 The Kim court focused on true
fiduciary duty – most likely interpreting the conundrum more strictly than
intended.
Chestman, discussing both classical and misappropriation theories,
offered perhaps the most robust discussion of both fiduciary duty and the
companion relationship of trust and confidence.45 On the fiduciary
relationship, Chestman looked fairly deeply at the nature of a fiduciary and
included the observation that a fiduciary exercises “discretionary authority”
for a dependent beneficiary.46 Moreover, the Chestman court noted that the
relationship entailed the obligation of agent confidentiality.47 Emphasizing a
narrow scope, Chestman then looked to Reed48 to recognize that a
38. See infra Parts II.B and II.C.
39. United States v. Kim, 184 F. Supp. 2d 1006 (N.D. Cal. 2002).
40. United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551 (2d. Cir. 1991).
41. United States v. Joon Kim, 184 F. Supp. 2d 1006, 1010 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (citing Chestman, 947
F.2d at 566).
42. Id. at 1010 (citing Chestman, 947 F.2d at 568).
43. Id. at 1010-1011.
44. Id. at 1018.
45. Chestman, 947 F.2d at 567-70.
46. Id. at 569.
47. Id.
48. United States v. Reed, 601 F. Supp. 685, 690 (S.D.N.Y.), rev’d on other grounds, 773 F.2d 477
(2d Cir. 1985).
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relationship characterized by repeated sharing of confidential information,
even without the clear duty of an agent to act in the best interest of a
dependent beneficiary, took on the nature of a fiduciary relationship.49 This
“less rigorous” version of fiduciary duty, though not generally accepted by
the Chestman court in a criminal fraud context, allows a broader reach, and
though lacking precision, appears closer to Powell’s construction in Dirks.50
Chestman interprets the conundrum closer to Powell’s apparent intentions in
Dirks and Chiarella.
Powell’s understanding of a fiduciary relationship in Dirks is first and
foremost the traditional configuration – one owed by an insider to a
corporation’s shareholders, and upon knowing breach, inherited by a tippee
from the insider tipper.51 Yet, Powell offered little or no discussion of a
superior-inferior relationship. He focused rather on a notion of largely
reciprocal confidentiality between tipper and tippee, not on a one-way duty
to act in the best interest of another.52 Even recognizing the underlying
relationship between a corporate insider and that corporation’s shareholders,
Powell’s notion is markedly distinct from a true, one directional fiduciary
relationship. Not surprisingly, this distinction has been conflated and
confused in the courts since Dirks.53 Courts appear to have continued to strive
for accurate interpretation of the unclear rule in Dirks rather than to have
seized the opportunity to clarify the nature of the duty to be found under
Section 10(b), though Rule 10b5-2 may have handed courts just that
opportunity twenty years ago.
2.

The Recent Focus on Personal Benefit
In finding no fiduciary duty owed to a subject corporation’s
shareholders by analysts learning of fraudulent accounting practices in that
publicly traded corporation, Dirks shifted focus from defining an underlying
would-be fiduciary duty to the nature of disclosure constituting breach of the
duty.54 This judgment of purpose required determining whether tippers
received a personal benefit in disclosing the fraud to tippees who then traded
in the corporation’s stock.55 Such consideration became vital because
49. Chestman, 947 F.2d at 569-70 (citing United States v. Reed, 601 F. Supp. 685, 690 (S.D.N.Y.),
rev’d on other grounds, 773 F.2d 477 (2d Cir. 1985).
50. Id.
51. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 660 (1983).
52. Id. at 655 (“The basis for recognizing this fiduciary duty is not simply that such persons acquired
nonpublic corporate information, but rather that they have entered into a special confidential relationship
in the conduct of the business of the enterprise and are given access to information solely for corporate
purposes.”).
53. See, e.g., United States v. Newman, 773 F.2d. 438, 445-46 (2d Cir. 2014) (when analysis
proceeds via the misappropriation theory rather than the classical theory, the personal benefit test has a
more defining role in establishing the breach of a fiduciary or fiduciary-like duty because it may involve
deciding whether the relationship at issue in the fraud on the source determination is or is not meaningful);
United States v. Salman, 792 F.3d 1087, 1093 (9th Cir. 2015).
54. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 660.
55. Id. at 666-667.
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“[w]hether disclosure is a breach of duty . . . depends in large part on the
purpose of the disclosure.”56 Confidential information shared for a proper
purpose would not constitute a breach, but such information shared for a
personal benefit would. At first read, the decision appears to turn here, “[i]n
the absence of a breach of duty to shareholders by the insiders, there was no
derivative breach by Dirks.”57 Yet, the Court seems, at the same time, to
hinge its decision on the finding that the “tippers received no monetary or
personal benefit for revealing Equity Funding’s secrets, nor was their
purpose to make a gift of valuable information to Dirks.”58
If there is a real difference in distinguishing Powell’s analysis of the
breach of fiduciary duty from other understandings of breach and fiduciary
duty generally, it lies in part in the concept of Powell’s personal benefit test
set out in Dirks.59 It may be that the personal benefit test has become the
latest incarnation of the fiduciary conundrum – another manifestation of a
duty of trust and confidence cloaked in a duty to act in another’s best interest.
The would-be clarification of the personal benefit test came in 2016
with the U.S. Supreme Court’s Salman60 decision. The Court granted cert.
in Salman to resolve an apparent disparity between the Second Circuit’s
Newman61 decision and the Ninth Circuit’s Salman decision.62 Previously,
the Newman court had held that a personal benefit was essential in finding
Section 10(b) liability.63 Newman looked to Dirks to find the requirement of
(i) a fiduciary breach by an insider, (ii) the inheritance of that breach by a
trading tippee, and (iii) the trading tippee’s knowledge that the information
resulted from that breach.64 From there, Newman noted that a personal
benefit to the breaching insider must be found.65 Then, Newman held that to
actually find Rule 10b-5 liability, the tippee trader must know of that
personal benefit to the insider/tipper.66 This explication by Judge Barrington
Parker, propounded in reviewing the Southern District’s jury instructions
below, resulted in overturning the Southern District’s prior conviction in the
case.67
Moreover, as Judge Parker delved further into Newman, fleshing out the
personal benefit analysis derived from Dirks, he explained that the concept
of knowing of the personal benefit could be found either (i) where benefit to
the tipper was pecuniary or (ii) where the tip entailing a tipper’s gift of the

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Id. at 662.
Id. at 667.
Id.
Id.
Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420, 425 (2016).
United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 2014).
Salman, 792 F.3d at 1092.
Newman, 773 F.3d at 447.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 448.
Id.
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information to be traded upon would enhance the tipper’s reputation, which
enhancement could only be inferred where a “meaningfully close personal
relationship” exists between tipper and tippee.68 Here, Judge Parker wrote
that a “mere friendship” would not meet this latter standard.69 Ultimately, of
course, Newman turned on two conclusions. 70 First, the Newman court
concluded that no inference could be drawn from the facts of the case as to
a relationship of the analysts covering the Dell-NVDIA transaction at issue
with the alleged tippees in finding any such personal benefit.71 Second, the
court found that no meaningful personal relationship existed among the
alleged investor relations insider tipper, industry analyst tippees, and
disseminators.72
In Salman, the U.S. Supreme Court apparently rebuked the Second
Circuit’s application of the personal benefit test in Newman.73 Writing for
the majority in Salman, Justice Alito made clear that Dirks would again
control the general securities fraud analysis, and that the issue in the instant
case would again center on the existence of a personal benefit to an insider
tipper who informed a trading tippee.74 Justice Alito saw the turning point in
the decision as simple. “Dirks makes clear that a tipper breaches a fiduciary
duty by making a gift of confidential information to “a trading relative,” and
that rule is sufficient to resolve the case at hand.”75 The tippee trader, Salman,
was a brother-in-law of a tipping insider and close friend of an
intermediary.76 Justice Alito repeatedly relied on language from Dirks, “[i]n
particular, we held [in Dirks] that “[t]he elements of fiduciary duty and
exploitation of nonpublic information also exist when an insider makes a gift
of confidential information to a trading relative or friend.” Ibid.”77
So the relationship of the tipper and tippee characterized as that of a
close relative or friend was enough to infer the personal benefit and rely on
Dirks to find liability in Salman while the Second Circuit had not found such
an inference in Newman, albeit under clearly distinguished facts. In
affirming Judge Rakoff’s Ninth Circuit Salman decision, Justice Alito took
pains to qualify Judge Parker’s approach in Newman.He wrote,, “[t]o the
extent the Second Circuit held that the tipper must also receive something of
a ‘pecuniary or similarly valuable nature’ in exchange for a gift to family or
friends, Newman, 773 F. 3d, at 452, we agree with the Ninth Circuit that this
requirement is inconsistent with Dirks.”78 This is to say that what really
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Id. at 452.
Id.
Id. at 453.
Id.
Id.
Salman, 137 S. Ct. at 423.
Id.
Id. at 427.
Id. at 424.
Id. at 427.
Id. at 428. (emphasis added).
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matters in Alito’s interpretation in Salman is consistent with the real meaning
behind the fiduciary conundrum in Powell’s Dirks and Chiarella. That real
meaning iswhether a relationship of trust and confidence exists, and whether
it has been breached. Clearly, a family relationship (as in Salman) is declared
to constitute a presumed relationship of trust and confidence, the breach of
which would constitute a violation of Rule 10b-5. This is so notwithstanding
the focus on the more narrowly framed issue of personal benefit in place of
a would-be general fiduciary duty.
After the Supreme Court spoke on the issue in Salman, the Second
Circuit revisited the same personal benefit issue in its 2017 Martoma II
decision,79 In Martoma II, Judge Katzmann turned again to the personal
benefit test, looking to the U.S. Supreme Court’s Salman decision, and
refused to recognize whether Alito’s opinion had actually rebuked Judge
Parker’s preceding Newman decision in its interpretation of the personal
benefit test.80 Martoma II affirmed a lower court conviction notwithstanding
what it found to be inaccurate jury instructions regarding the personal benefit
test.81 Pointedly, Katzmann’s majority opinion in Martoma II noted that the
personal benefit test could be read in either of two ways – with the
meaningful personal relationship between tipper and tippee necessarily
included together with a tipper’s intent to benefit from providing the nonpublic information to a tippee, or alternatively, either element found
independent of the other.82 The Katzmann majority chose the latter reading
(relying on the Second Circuit’s SEC v. Warde83), and then reasoned that the
facts at trial were sufficient to meet that standard, justifying its affirmance of
the lower court conviction, notwithstanding the jury instruction nuances.84
Thus, a doctor’s disclosure of the not yet public Elan-Wyeth Phase 2
Alzheimer drug trial results to an investor hedge fund manager was enough
to demonstrate an adequate personal benefit either on the facts that the
disclosing doctor received a quid-pro-quo-like consulting fee or on the facts
that the disclosing doctor received a personal benefit with the intention of
that the tippee benefit from the disclosure.85
Since Powell and his construction of the would-be controlling fiduciary
principle, the most influential judge opining on insider and outsider trading
may be Jed S. Rakoff, albeit not as a justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, but
as a judge on the Southern District of New York, and as a designated judge

79. United State v. Martoma, 894 F.3d 64 passim (2d Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 2665 (2019)
[hereinafter Martoma II].
80. Id. at 71.
81. Id. at 68.
82. Martoma II, 894 F.3d at 74.
83. SEC v. Warde, 151 F.3d 42, 48 (2d Cir. 1998).
84. Martoma II, 894 F.3d at 74. See Thai H. Park, Newman/Martoma: The Insider Trading Law’s
Impasse and the Promise of Congressional Action, 25 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 1, 49-52 (2019)
(discussing the personal benefit test in Martoma II and beyond).
85. Id. at 74-75.
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on both the Second and Ninth Circuits.86 In both the Ninth Circuit’s Salman
87
and in the Second Circuit’s Pinto-Thomaz,88 Judge Rakoff delved into the
explication of fiduciary duty. Justice Alito affirmed Rakoff in the Supreme
Court’s Salman decision and led the Court to reiterate Rakoff’s take on
fiduciary duty from the Ninth Circuit, pointedly with no attention to Rules
10b5-1 and 10b5-2.89
In affirming Judge Rakoff’s Ninth Circuit Salman decision, the
Supreme Court accepted Powell’s “principle” of fiduciary breach as
controlling the finding of violations under Section 10(b).90 Alito wrote in his
Supreme Court Salman decision affirming Rakoff:
In Dirks v. SEC, 463 U. S. 646, this Court explained that a tippee’s liability
for trading on inside information hinges on whether the tipper breached a
fiduciary duty by disclosing the information. A tipper breaches such a
fiduciary duty, we held, when the tipper discloses the inside information
for a personal benefit. And, we went on to say, a jury can infer a personal
benefit—and thus a breach of the tipper’s duty—where the tipper receives
something of value in exchange for the tip or “makes a gift of confidential
information to a trading relative or friend.” Id., at 664, 103 S. Ct. 3255, 77
L. Ed. 2d 911.91

Thus, the focus is on a breach of the Powell fiduciary principle
enunciated in Dirks, which hinges on the existence of a personal benefit to
the tipper and the tippee’s knowledge of the personal benefit. Yet, the
underlying issue of interpretation of the fiduciary conundrum is consistent.
What really is at issue remains whether a duty of trust and confidence exists,
and whether it is breached.
In both the Ninth Circuit and the U.S. Supreme Court Salman decisions,
the authors are concerned to limit the permissiveness of information
disclosure under the Second Circuit’s Newman92 decision, which
permissiveness was heralded by a number of scholars.93 Newman held that
we cannot infer a tippee’s knowledge of a personal benefit to his tipper when
the relationship between tipper and tippee lacks “proof of a meaningfully
close personal relationship that generates an exchange that is objective,
86. See United States v. Salman, 792 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2015), aff’d, 137 S. Ct. 420 (2016) and
United States v. Pinto-Thomaz, 352 F. Supp. 3d 287 (S.D.N.Y. 2018).
87. See Salman, 792 F.3d at 1092.
88. See Pinto-Thomaz, 352 F. Supp. 3d at 295.
89. See Salman v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 420, 429 (2016).
90. Id. at 425.
91. Id. at 423.
92. United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 577 U.S. 874 (2015).
93. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Law Professors, Stephen Bainbridge, M. Todd Henderson, and
Jonathan Macey in Opposition to the United States of America’s Petition for Rehearing or Rehearing En
Banc at 1, United States v. Newman 773 F.3d 438 (2014), (No. 13-1837-cr(L)), 2015 WL 1064409; see
also, A.C. Pritchard, Dirks and the Genesis of Personal Benefit, 68 SMU L. REV. 857, 861 (2015);
Pritchard, supra note 18; A.C. Pritchard, Tributes to Professor Alan R. Bromberg: Dirks and the Genesis
of Personal Benefit, 68 SMU L. REV. 857 (2015).
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consequential, and represents at least a potential gain of a pecuniary or
similarly valuable nature.”94 Of course, the Newman Court again looked back
to Powell’s Dirks decision.95
In declining to follow a limited read of Newman, Rakoff wrote in the
Ninth Circuit’s Salman, that doing so…
“would require us to depart from the clear holding of Dirks that the
element of breach of fiduciary duty is met where an “insider makes a gift
of confidential information to a trading relative or friend.” Dirks, 463 U.S.
at 664. Indeed, Newman itself recognized that the “‘personal benefit is
broadly defined to include not only pecuniary gain, but also, inter alia, . . .
the benefit one would obtain from simply making a gift of confidential
information to a trading relative or friend.’” Newman, 773 F.3d at 452
(alteration omitted) (quoting United States v. Jiau, 734 F.3d 147, 153 (2d
Cir. 2013)).”96

In all of this parsing out of the breach of a would-be fiduciary duty, the
relationships that give rise to a duty, and the associated knowledge of a
personal benefit inferred to be pecuniary if only relational, we find no
attention given to Rule 10b5-2. One wonders why is there no discussion of
Rule 10b5-2(b)’s standards of duties of trust or confidence particularly in the
tipper-tippee scenarios where the misappropriation theory is most likely to
be applied? Wasn’t this rule intended to address just this issue? Any of these
cases could have proceeded under the misappropriation theory as
promulgated in Rules 10b5-1 and 10b5-2. If they had, the relationships at
issue would have been redirected from control by the insufficiently clear
Dirks, to control by defined relationships of trust or confidence, either as
enumerated or principled under Rule 10b5-2.
B.

MISAPPROPRIATION ADOPTION AND PROMULGATION
If Powell defined the federal law of insider trading, the “classical”
theory, under Section 10(b) with his 1980 Chiarella and 1983 Dirks
decisions, major change came in 1997 with Justice Ginsburg’s adoption of
the fraud-on-the-source misappropriation theory in O’Hagan9798 With
O’Hagan, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized that the relationship giving
rise to a duty to disclose or abstain from trading need not be limited to
insiders owing such a duty to issuing corporation shareholders in whose
stock disputed trades were made.99 Rather, a fraud on the source of the
information, whatever that non-public source may be, could be enough to

94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Newman, 773 F.3d at 452.
Id.
Salman, 792 F.3d at 1094-95.
United States v. Salman, 792 F.3d 1087, 1093 (2015).
See Madden, supra note 2 at 58.
O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 660.
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establish the breach of a fiduciary-like duty or a relationship of trust or
confidence leading to Section 10(b) securities fraud liability.100
Somewhat surprisingly, the federal courts’ interpretation and
application of the role of a fiduciary relationship in finding insider or outsider
trading has remained unclear, or at least subject to debate, not only since
Dirks, but even since the Commission’s subsequent promulgation of the
misappropriation theory in Rules 10b5-1 and 10b5-2, together with Reg. FD
back in 2000.101 Rule 10b5-1 “defines when a purchase or sale constitutes
trading “on the basis of” material nonpublic information in insider trading
cases brought under Section 10(b).”102 Under Rule 10b5-1, the “on the basis
of” element is met where the trader has awareness of the material nonpublic
information.103 Moreover, Rule 10b5-1(a) expressly applies to those trades
that are made with an awareness of that material nonpublic information “in
breach of a duty of trust or confidence that is owed directly, indirectly, or
derivatively, to the issuer of that security or the shareholders of that issuer,
or to any other person who is the source of the material nonpublic
information.”104 This rule obviously is both informed by, and contemplates,
varied tipper-tippee scenarios at issue in prior Rule 10b-5 cases.
Thus, Rule 10b5-1 incorporates the fraud on the source version of the
misappropriation theory from Ginsburg’s majority opinion in O’Hagan.105
At the same time, the rule fails to include the word “fiduciary” even while
speaking to the all-important “duty of trust or confidence.”106
Even under the misappropriation theory, in all of this parsing out of a
would-be fiduciary duty, the relationships that give rise to it, and the
associated knowledge of a personal benefit tied to it and inferred to be
pecuniary if only relational, we still find far too little federal court attention
given to Rule 10b5-2. Courts have failed to adequately embrace Rule 10b52(b)’s standards of duties of trust or confidence and express categories of
relationships giving rise to those duties notwithstanding the fact that the
Commission expressly promulgated this rule to address just this issue.

100. See Madden, supra note 3, at 68 (noting Justice Ginsburg’s adoption of the government’s fraud
on the source theory of misappropriation as presented in its brief).
101. See Donna M. Nagy, Insider Trading and the Gradual Demise of Fiduciary Principles, 94 IOWA
L. REV. 1315, 1319 (2009) (“Despite the Supreme Court’s explicit dictate that fiduciary principles
underlie the offense of insider trading, there have been recent repeated instances in which lower federal
courts and the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) have disregarded these principles. On some
occasions, judicial adherence to fiduciary principles would have dictated rulings in favor of defendants
charged with insider trading, but courts essentially ignored those principles.”). See also, Madden, supra
note 2, at 70-75.
102. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Exchange Act Release No. 7881 (Aug. 15, 2000); 17
C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1 (2021), supra note 6.
103. Id.
104. Id. (emphasis added).
105. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Exchange Act Release No. 7881 (Aug. 15, 2000); 17
C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1 (2021), supra note 6.
106. Id. (emphasis added).
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Any insider trading case since 2000 could have proceeded under the
misappropriation theory as promulgated in Rules 10b5-1 and 10b5-2. If
courts had made use of Rule 10b5-2, the relationships at issue would have
been redirected from control by Dirks’ continually varied interpretations to
control by more clearly defined relationships of trust or confidence, either
enumerated or principled. Moreover, if courts had made more use of Rule
10b5-2 since 2000, repeated (and repeatedly failed) attempts at legislative
reform of insider trading might not have been necessary.107
Rule 10b5-2’s duty of trust or confidence is itself in some distinction to
the duty of trust and confidence tied to earlier Chiarella and Dirks precedent
under Rule 10b-5, preceding the adoption of Rules 10b5-1 and 10b5-2.108
That apparently trivial distinction is actually meaningful in parsing out the
role of fiduciary duty in securities fraud not only under “classical theory”
insider trading analysis, but also under the misappropriation theory of insider
trading. Its repercussions affect whether the determinative duty need be a
true fiduciary duty, and whether it need be comprised of care and loyalty
together with confidentiality. Whether the breach of a duty of confidentiality
alone is enough to meet the element is discussed further herein, infra.
Rule 10b5-2 “addresses the issue of when a breach of a family or other
non-business relationship may give rise to liability under the
misappropriation theory of insider trading.”109 The rule sets forth three nonexclusive bases for determining that “a duty of trust or confidence was owed
by a person receiving information, and . . . provide[s] greater certainty and
clarity on this unsettled issue.”110 Yet, again, Rule 10b5-2, while defining a
duty of trust or confidence, does not mention the word “fiduciary.”111 This
appears to be a logical intention to avoid the misuse and confusion of
fiduciary relationships and associated terminology in Dirks and subsequent
107. See, e.g., Insider Trading Prohibition Act, H.R. 2534, 116th Cong. § 16A (2019) (as approved
by H.R. Fin. Serv. Comm., May 8, 2019, and committed to the H. Comm. of the Whole, Sept. 27, 2019)
(taking the wrongfully obtained material inside information approach advocated by Prof. Nagy); see also
Harvey L. Pitt & Karen L. Shapiro, The Insider Trading Proscriptions Act of 1987: A Legislative Initiative
for a Sorely Needed Clarification of the Law Against Insider Trading, 39 ALA. L. REV. 415 (1988).
108. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 228; Dirks, 463 U.S. at 663.
109. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-2 (2021), supra note 7.
110. [33-7881 supra, note 6. “As discussed in the Proposing Release [33-7887], the prohibitions
against insider trading in our securities laws play an essential role in maintaining the fairness, health, and
integrity of our markets. We have long recognized that the fundamental unfairness of insider trading
harms not only individual investors but also the very foundations of our markets, by undermining investor
confidence in the integrity of the markets. Congress, by enacting two separate laws providing enhanced
penalties for insider trading, has expressed its strong support for our insider trading enforcement program.
And the Supreme Court in United States v. O’Hagan has recently endorsed a key component of insider
trading law, the “misappropriation” theory, as consistent with the “animating purpose” of the federal
securities laws: “to insure honest securities markets and thereby promote investor confidence.”
As discussed more fully in the Proposing Release, insider trading law has developed on a case-bycase basis under the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws, primarily Section 10(b) of the
Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5. As a result, from time to time there have been issues on which various
courts disagreed. Rules 10b5-1 and 10b5-2 resolve two such issues.”
111. Id.
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court decisions. The fiduciary conundrum results from the misnomer of
fiduciary relationships in the element of deceit which actually centers on an
often reciprocal confidential relationship rather than a one directional
obligation to act in the best interest of another. Rules 10b5-1 and 10b5-2
properly clarified the element by focusing on tits real essence confidentiality. The absence of the word fiduciary in these rules should be
read as the Commission’s recognition that the inherently one directional
obligation of an agent charged to act in the best interest of another is not
where deceit turns. Deceit turns on breach of confidence, whether by silence
or disclosure.
Again, Rules 10b5-1 and 10b5-2 expressly codified the fraud on the
source version of the misappropriation theory adopted in Justice Ginsburg’s
majority opinion in O’Hagan.112 The misappropriation theory extends
Section 10(b) anti-fraud coverage beyond the insiders addressed by the
classical theory of insider trading, supplanting the temporary insider theory
previously relied upon to address tippee liability.113 Again, neither the text of
Rules 10b5-1 and 10b5-2, nor the rules’ proposing release, nor the release
adopting the rules, includes the word fiduciary; all are expressly principally
concerned with “dut[ies] of trust or confidence” that are more accurately the
real concern of the element of fraud or deceit in insider trading.114 Proper
application of these rules could have and still can lay bare the intentional or
unintentional obfuscation of the fiduciary conundrum originating with
Powell’s Dirks and Chiarella decisions.
Yet, to date, the 2000 rules have been largely ignored. Federal cases
decided under the misappropriation theory in the wake of O’Hagan include
the Second Circuit’s 2001 United States v. Falcone,115 and Eleventh Circuit’s
2003 S.E.C. v. Yun116 Each of these cases applied and expounded upon the
fraud on the source misappropriation theory adopted in Justice Ginsburg’s
O’Hagan decision.117 Yun emphasized the broad applicability of the
misappropriation theory and noted that the misappropriation theory logically
subsumes the classical theory, as it offers means to assess duty and breach
whether that duty is born by an insider or outsider.118 While Falcone made
112. See supra text accompanying notes 6 and 7.
113. See Madden, supra note 3, at 58-65 (discussing Ginsburg’s construction of the fraud on the
source misappropriation theory and the key precedent of Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19 (1987)
and other prior federal decisions as precursors to O’Hagan); See generally Gregory S. Crespi, The
Availability After Carpenter of Private Rights of Action under Rule 10b-5 Based Upon the
Misappropriation of Information Concerning Acquisitions, 26 AM. BUS. L.J. 710 (1988) (offering further
elucidation of Carpenter); See also Prentice, supra note 10, at 348-9 (discussing the temporary insider
theory).
114. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (Rule 10b-5) supra note 7 (“It shall be unlawful for any person…(c) to
engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit
upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.”).
115. United States v. Falcone, 257 F.3d 226 (2d Cir. 2001).
116. SEC v. Yun, 327 F. 3d 1263 (11th Cir. 2003).
117. Falcone, 257 F.3d 226; Yun, 327 F.3d 1263.
118. Yun, 327 F.3d at 1276.
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no reference to Rule 10b5-2, Yun gave the then new rule significant attention
in its reasoning.119 Yun relied on the Commission’s justification for the rule
in finding the breach of confidence in a spousal relationship as enumerated
in Rule 10b5-2(b)(3) to constitute insider trading, commenting that
Chestman’s reluctance to do so was to interpret the rule too narrowly.120 Yet,
Yun’s consideration of Rule 10b5-2 would not become a consistent norm for
federal courts analyzing facts under the misappropriation theory.121
Five years after promulgation, in 2005, the Second Circuit eschewed
Rule 10b5-2 and discussed Chiarella, O’Hagan, and Zandford122 in S.E.C. v.
Dorozhko,123 determining that those precedents did not individually or in the
aggregate require breach of duty to find a Section 10(b) violation.124 Rather,
Dorozhko focused on deception and fraud outside of a defined fiduciary or
like relationship creating a duty.125 Dorozhko also looked to the Fifth
Circuit’s Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Credit Suisse First Boston (USA),
Inc., 126 for support in this reading of precedent.127 Eight years after Rule
10b5-2’s promulgation, in 2008, the Central District of California’s S.E.C.
v. Talbot, applied the misappropriation theory in considering breach of duty
by a corporation’s board member and ignored Rule 10b5-2. 128
In contrast, only two years after promulgation, Judge Charles Breyer of
the Northern District of California had looked to Rule 10b5-2 in United
States v. Joon Kim.129 The Kim court broke ground in applying Rule 10b5-2
even as it looked to Chestman for explication of the fiduciary conundrum.130
While the Kim court did not rely entirely on the Rule 10b5-2, the court,
similar to the Eleventh Circuit in Yun, noted that the rule was persuasive and
expressly promulgated to sharpen the discussion of duty and breach in
Chestman.131

119. Id. at 1274.
120. Id. at 1272-73.
121. See Madden, supra note 3, at 70-74.
122. SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813 (2002) (focusing on the “in connection with” element and
looking to O’Hagan to support the recognition of a summarily accepted fiduciary relationship between a
stock broker and the broker’s clients).
123. SEC v. Dorozhko, 574 F.3d 42 (2d Cir. 2009).
124. Id. at 48.
125. Id. See also SEC v. Rocklage, 470 F.3d 1, 19-21 (1st Cir. 2006) (discussing a wife’s deception
of her husband as a source of material nonpublic information in an extended “in connection with” analysis
under O’Hagan yet ignoring Rule 10b5-2).
126. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. V. Credit Suisse First Boston, 482 F.3d 372 (5th Cir. 2007).
127. SEC v. Dorozhko, 574 F.3d 42, 48 (2nd Cir. 2009) (citing Regents, 482 F.3d at 372, 389); see
also, United States v. Evans, 486 F.3d 315 (7th Cir. 2007) (discussing the misappropriation theory under
O’Hagan and looking for a breach of a duty of loyalty and confidentiality).
128. SEC v. Talbot, 430 F. Supp. 2d 1029 (C.D. Cal. 2006).
129. Id.
130. Kim, 184 F. Supp. at 1020.
131. Id. at 1014-15.
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C.

FIDUCIARY VERSUS FIDUCIARY-LIKE
In the outsider trading context, the federal courts have struggled to
make sense of the place of fiduciary duty grounded in common law deceit
and misrepresentation in violation of the SEC rules promulgated under
Section 10(b). A number of courts have referred to “duties of trust and
confidence,” while Rules 10b5-1 and 10b5-2 have expressly sought to define
“relationships of trust or confidence” where misappropriation of material
nonpublic information might exist.132 Yet, few court decisions since Dirks
have explicitly illuminated fiduciary duty per se.
Both O’Hagan and Chestman together were the primary sources for the
Commission in proposing and promulgating Rules 10b-5-1 and 10b5-2.133
Each decision discussed fiduciary duty, though the discussion in Chestman134
delved more deeply into the duty as including a “relationship of trust and
confidence” that is the “functional equivalent of a fiduciary.”135 O’Hagan
involved a classic fiduciary relationship between a lawyer and client, albeit
not between a corporate insider and shareholders.136 The functional
equivalency in Chestman and the import of the fiduciary relationship in
O’Hagan’s fraud on the source formulation, cohere in centering on a
relationship of shared confidence. This does not, however, focus on the true
and unique nature of a fiduciary relationship which, again, is characterized
by a one-way obligation of one party to act in the best interest of another. As
discussed, supra, the fiduciary terminology is a function of Justice Powell’s
original language in Chiarella and Dirks and more accurately about
relationships characterized by often reciprocal confidentiality. Perhaps
“fiduciary-like” should be read as a marker for such established confidence.
Some alternate terminology must be consistently adhered to by the courts if
we are to resolve the fiduciary conundrum. Certainly, Rules 10b5-1 and
10b5-2 offer reasonable means to clarify the fiduciary conundrum. The rules’
formulation of duties of trust or confidence may be the best route to the real
focus in Chiarella and Dirks and consequently virtually all insider or
outsider trading cases since.
In 2003, in S.E.C. v. Kirch,137 the Northern District of Illinois
considered the legality of a CEO Roundtable member’s trade based on
material nonpublic information that the member learned of at a Roundtable
meeting.138 The court did not reference Rule 10b5-2, but reasoned,

132. See, e.g., Kim, 184 F. Supp. at 1010.
133. Proposed Rule: Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading No. 34-7787, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
¶ 82,846 (Dec. 20, 1999).
134. Chestman, 947 F.2d at 569.
135. United States v. Corbin, 729 F. Supp. 2d 607, 614, 616-17 (S.D.N.Y 2010).
136. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642.
137. United States SEC v. Kirch, 263 F. Supp. 2d 1144 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (the court notes somewhat
similar facts in Kim and pointedly chooses not to be persuaded by Kim, 184 F. Supp. 2d at 1150-1151).
138. Id.
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What is plain to this Court, and what it holds, is that the “duty of loyalty
and confidentiality” owed by the outsider…to the person…who shared
confidential information with him or her (the quoted phrase is from
O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652) is not limited to fiduciary relationships in the
limited sense that requires such factors as control and dominance on the part
of the fiduciary. Instead that “duty of loyalty and confidentiality” can be
(and is) created by precisely the type of policy and expectations that are
present in the Roundtable relationships here (see the discussion in Yun, 327
F.3d at 1272-73). 139
The facts in Kirch offer just the situation to which Rule 10b5-2 speaks
and which so many courts have overlooked in turning back to Dirks and the
fiduciary conundrum.140 Rule 10b5-2 offers a clearer standard that is more in
tune with the purpose of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 –which it was
intended to further. Rule 10b5-2(b)(2) specifically describes an enumerated
duty of trust or confidence where persons have a “history, pattern, or practice
of sharing confidences” such that those persons expect . . . that the recipient
will maintain [that]. . . confidentiality.”141
It is apparent that the federal courts’ focus on the fraud or deceit element
since Chiarella and Dirks actually turned more on the breach of duty arising
from a relationship characterized by often reciprocal and established
confidentiality rather than on a true fiduciary relationship of one party
obligated to act in the best interest of another. The “fiduciary-like”
terminology is certainly closer to reality than fiduciary duty per se. Rule
10b5-2 maintained this essence of confidentiality in the fraud or deceit
element with the Commission’s reasonable promulgation of the
misappropriation theory, leaving aside the misused and problematic
language of fiduciary duty per se. Yet, precious few courts have taken the
opportunity to employ Rules 10b5-1 and 10b5-2 as a means of clarifying the
law of insider and outsider trading under the misappropriation theory.
Instead, court after court has continued to look back to Dirks and struggled
with an inherently flawed fiduciary puzzle. Still, other courts have actively
supported attacks on Rule 10b5-2 in an apparent rejection of the
misappropriation theory.142
D.

DISCUSSIONS OF RULE 10B5-2
Rule 10b5-1 and 10b5-2 were really all about the relationship of
established confidence that courts have conflated with fiduciary duty. The
Commission’s drafting of the rules relied on the Second Circuit’s 1991
Chestman decision. 143 Chestman, informed by Chiarella and Dirks, offers
the most developed discussion of fiduciary duty, unpacking its true meaning
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

Id. at 1150. (emphasis added).
Id.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-2 (2021), supra note 7.
See, e.g., Cuban, 634 F. Supp. 2d 713.
United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991).
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and its connection to other relationships of trust and confidence. Donna Nagy
has asserted that the SEC via Rules 10b5-1, 10b5-2, the courts, and a shift of
focus toward the wrongful use of material information, have diminished the
role of fiduciary duty that Dirks and Chiarella established.144 She, as well as
others, calls for legislation to define insider trading liability, rather than
leaving the door open to what she perceives will be further lower court
confusion.145
Certain courts have made more specific use of the rules. After the
Eleventh Circuit’s 2003 Yun 146 decision made use of Rule 10b5-2, the
Northern District of Texas addressed the rule in 2005 in SEC v. Kornman.147
Kornman examined the SEC’s allegations against an attorney/consultant
who allegedly traded in the stock of a merger target on information learned
while the attorney/consultant met with executives of the merger target.148 The
court looked to Chestman and the Southern District of New York’s SEC v.
Cassese149 for guidance on whether a fiduciary duty or duty of trust and
confidence had been formed between the consultant and the executive.150 The
court also looked to Rule 10b5-2(1) to find an “enumerated duty of trust or
confidence” “whenever a person agrees to maintain information in
confidence.”151 This provision applied because the consultant’s policies
required it, and the consultant had been accustomed to utilizing strict
confidentiality policies and procedures, including engagement letter clauses,
agreements, and memo writing which would typically be required in
formalizing the relationship at issue, prohibiting any personal use of
confidential information learned in the relationship.152
The Kornman court, like Cassese, also looked to Kim for explication of
fiduciary duty, focusing on finding “disparate knowledge and expertise” and
“a persuasive need to share confidential information.”153 Indeed, each of
Kim, Cassess, and Kornman construe that a fiduciary-like relationship can
be established by a persuasive need to share confidential information.
In denying a motion for summary judgement, the Kornman court
reasoned further under Rule 10b5-2, “[b]ased on the allegations in the
complaint, a reasonable inference can be drawn that the parties understood
that a trust or confidence had been reposed . . . not to use this confidential
information for personal gain.” 154 Moreover, the court noted that

144. Nagy, supra note 9; see, e.g., Prentice, supra note 10, at 372.
145. Id.; see infra Part II.
146. See supra Part II.B.
147. SEC v. Kornman, 391 F. Supp. 2d 477 passim (N.D. Tex., Dallas Div. 2005).
148. Id.
149. United States v. Cassese, 273 F. Supp. 2d 481(S.D.N.Y. 2003).
150. Kornman, 391 F. Supp. at 487-489.
151. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-2 (2021).
152. Kornman, 391 F. Supp at 480-81.
153. Kornman, 392 F. Supp. at 488 (citing Kim, 184 F. Supp. 2d at 1011 and Cassese, 273 F. Supp.
2d at 486).
154. Id. at 492.
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“understanding of the confidentiality can be readily inferred from the
confidentiality safeguards employed by [the consultant].”155 Thus, Kornman
offers one of the few clear and direct applications of Rule 10b5-2, five years
after the rule became effective. In addition, the court set discussion of the
rule in the context of related case discussions of Chestman and subsequent
decisions, noting Chestman’s centrality to the rule.156 One wonders why
more courts have not done the same or more with Rule 10b5-2.
In 2009 SEC v. Lyon,157 the Southern District of New York relied
primarily on Chestman to determine whether a duty of confidence was
adequately plead.158 The creation of the duty was seen to depend in part upon
knowing acceptance of a confidential relationship via confidentiality
provisions included in private placement memoranda issued to prospective
PIPE159 investors. While the Lyon court looked to Rule 10b5-1 in its analysis
of the “on the basis of” determination of the trades involved, the court made
no explicit reference to Rule 10b5-2 in its consideration of a duty of trust or
confidence and the breach of that duty by the defendant’s trading without
disclosing material nonpublic information obtained through the
relationship.160 Yet, in 2015, the Southern District of New York offered one
of the most robust discussions of Rule 10b5-2 in a case brought by private
right of action, Veleron v. Stanley.161 Veleron focused on the materiality of
non-public information Morgan Stanley employees had concerning a
corporation, Magna, in which Veleron had invested in part with funds loaned
by BNP Paribas and serviced in part by Morgan Stanley.162 The court looked
to Rule 10b5-2 to find that Morgan Stanley’s contractual relationship with
BNP Paribas was confidential and fiduciary-like such that non-public
material information Morgan Stanley learned in the relationship could be
actionable under Section 10(b) if Morgan Stanley traded on the basis of that
information.163
1.

Agreement to Maintain Confidence
Perhaps the most intense disagreement over the role of fiduciary duty
in insider and outsider trading since the adoption of Rule 10b5-2(b)(1)’s
155. Id.
156. Id. at 487.
157. SEC v. Lyon, 605 F. Supp. 2d 531(S.D.N.Y. 2009).
158. Id. at 545-46.
159. “PIPE (Private Investment in Public Equity)”.
160. Id. at 547-48.
161. Veleron v. Stanley, 117 F. Supp. 3d 404, 436 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (“In Rule 10b5-2, the S.E.C. has
“provide[d] a non-exclusive set of examples in which a ‘duty’ arises for purposes of § 10(b) and Rule
10b-5 Gansman, 657 F.3d 85, 91 (2d Cir. 2011) (citing 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-2 Preliminary Note; Insider
Trading, U.S. Securities and Exchange ‘Commission, http://www.sec.gov/answers/insider.htm (“[Rule
10b5-2] provides that a person, receiving confidential information under circumstances specified in the
rule would owe a duty of trust or confidence and thus could be liable under the misappropriation theory.”))
(emphasis added); accord S.E.C. v. Yun, 327 F.3d 1263, 1273 n.23 (11th Cir. 2003)”).
162. Id. at 430-35.
163. Id. at 436, 440, 451-52, 455, 457.
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enumerated category, “whenever a person agrees to maintain information in
confidence” 164 came in the Northern District of Texas’ S.E.C. v. Cuban.165
This subpart was central to the much-debated battle in Cuban over whether
Mark Cuban knowingly entered into a confidential relationship with an
issuer who called to solicit his investment in a PIPE.166 (Cuban sold his
already owned shares in the public corporation after being solicited and
apparently becoming fearful of dilution resulting from the planned issuance
of more shares.167)
What constitutes such an agreement to maintain confidence? Must that
agreement be an express oral or written contract? Can it be implied? These
considerations are particularly difficult where the trade is executed by an
outsider who may have established a relationship of confidence with an
insider or quasi-insider–generally a subset of the outsider trading situation,
sometimes considered a “temporary insider” situation.168
The Fifth Circuit’s reversal and remand in S.E.C. v. Cuban169 centered
on this very issue.170 “Given the paucity of jurisprudence on the question of
what constitutes a relationship of “trust and confidence” and the inherently
fact-bound nature of determining whether such a duty exists;” the court
reasoned that it would send the matter back for further discovery and retrial
(which the SEC ultimately lost).171 The Fifth Circuit refused to accept the
lower court’s determination that the agreement to maintain confidence
described in Rule 10b5-2(b)(1) required not only an agreement to maintain
confidence, but also an agreement not to trade on the material information
learned in that confidence.172
The Northern District of Texas’ Cuban example is favorable in that it
turned to Rule 10b5-2 and grappled extensively with the rule and the duty it
defines. Yet, it is problematic. It failed to find in Rule 10b5-2(b)(1) adequate
clarity to determine that the confidential relationship between Mark Cuban
and the issuer CEO was of the nature intended to be covered by the rule. In
fact, the Northern District attacked Rule 10b5-2, finding that it improperly
premised Section 10(b) liability on simple confidentiality and not

164. See supra text accompanying note 7.
165. SEC v. Cuban, 634 F. Supp. 2d 713, 729-31 (N.D. Tex. 2009), vacated, 620 F.3d 551 (5th Cir.
2010).
166. Id.
167. Id. at 717-18. (Cuban was famously quoted as allegedly saying “I’m screwed. I can’t sell.” upon
hanging up the phone as he realized the PIPE would dilute his existing holdings in the issuer and
apparently realized he should not trade on the would-be material confidential information of the pending
PIPE).
168. Prentice, supra note 10, at 369.
169. SEC v. Cuban, 620 F.3d 551 (5th Cir. 2010).
170. Id. at 558.
171. Cuban, 620 F.3d at 558; Tom V. Ripper, Mark Cuban Beats The SEC, FORBES (Oct. 26 2013,
3:59 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/tomvanriper/2013/10/16/mark-cuban-should-be-optimistic-ashis-insider-trading-case-heads-to-the-jury/?sh=23806b561320.
172. Id. at 557.
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confidentiality coupled with an agreement not to trade.173 In its discussion,
the Northern District dug into the usual laundry list of precedent decided
long before the rule’s promulgation. The court’s judgement on the rule was
in apparent error.174 Yet, the Fifth Circuit maneuvered around the issue on
review, leaving the direct challenge of the Rule 10b5-2 standard
unresolved.175
2.

Challenge under Chevron
In the Third Circuit’s 2014 United States v. McGee,176 the defendant
appealed his conviction under Rule 10b5-2, in the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania’s 2012 United States v. McGee,177 on the theory that conviction
under the rule lacked the required finding of fiduciary duty under Section
10(b).178 Thus, the battle over Rule 10b5-2 on appeal in McGee II focused on
the relationship between an insider tipper and an outsider tippee.179 McGee
II considered whether a tipper-tippee relationship in which the parties were
in amentor-mentee (Alcoholics Anonymous co-members) relationship
creates a fiduciary duty under Rule 10(b).180The principal challenge to Rule
10b5-2 in McGee II was that the SEC had exceeded its rule-making authority
and violated Chevron by promulgating the rule. The challenge was that
deception must exist to convict under Section 10(b) and that deception in a
tipper-tippee scenario requires a fiduciary duty and a breach thereof by a
tippee’s disclosure of material nonpublic information. 181 Writing for the
Third Circuit, Aldisert found that Section 10(b) left open ambiguity as to
what constitutes a “deceptive device” and that the SEC “filled the gap” in
the regulation with Rule 10b5-2. 182 Indeed, the Third Circuit went on to
accurately read precedent on the fiduciary conundrum, writing, “Supreme
173. Cuban, 634 F. Supp. 2d at 730-731; See Prentice, supra note 10, at 3 (“The trial judge [in Cuban]
noted in a footnote that Rule 10b5-2(b)(1) probably extended beyond family situations, (citing Cuban,
634 F. Supp. 2d at 728 n.9 (citing SEC v. Nothern, 598 F. Supp. 2d 167, 174-75 (D. Mass. 2009)) but,
drawing upon the same misguided distinction he had applied to the agreement-based duty not to trade,
held that the extension of liability present in subsection (b)(1) was beyond the SEC’s authority to
promulgate because it did not require an express promise to refrain from using the information in addition
to the confidentiality promise (citing Cuban at 730-31)”).
174. Prentice, supra note 10 at 360 (“The opinion cites no authority for this proposition. It seems
unlikely that there is any.”).
175. Cuban, 620 F.3d at 657 (“The allegations, taken in their entirety, provide more than a plausible
basis to find that the understanding between the CEO and Cuban was that he was not to trade, that it was
more than a simple confidentiality agreement.”); see also Andrew Verstein, Insider Tainting: Strategic
Tipping of Material Nonpublic Information, 112 NW. U. L. REV. 725 passim (2018) (discussing the
implications and treatment of situations similar to Cuban’s).
176. United States v. McGee, 763 F.3d 304 (3d Cir. 2014).
177. United States v. McGee, 892 F. Supp. 2d 726 (E.D. Pa. 2012).
178. McGee II, 763 F.3d at 308.
179. McGee II, 763 F.3d 304 passim.
180. Id. at 308-09.
181. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842--843 (1984)
(setting out the two step analysis of what is now known as Chevron deference).
182. McGee II, 763 F.3d at 313.

54

HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 18:1

Court precedent does not unequivocally require a fiduciary duty for all §
10(b) nondisclosure liability. In O’Hagan, though the defendant’s duty to
disclose undoubtedly arose from his position as a fiduciary, the Court
stressed that “This is distinct and broader than a fiduciary duty, per se.” 183
Moreover, Judge Aldisert noted in McGee II that “[t]he SEC explicitly
rejected limiting liability to those who share “business confidences.”184 The
SEC instead favored a facts--and-circumstances test and noted that the type
of confidences historically shared between parties could be a relevant
factor.”185 The McGee II court prudently found that the facts of the AA based
mentorship and friendship in McGee I and McGee II were just what the
Commission had in mind in adopting Rule 10b5-2(b)(2)–a relationship
showing a pattern of shared confidence.186 This important point supports the
claim that the nature of the relationship at the heart of insider trading liability
under Section 10(b) is often reciprocal and always one of established
confidence, not one characterized by a one-way fiduciary obligation to act in
the best interest of another.
Few courts have been so bold as Aldisert’s Third Circuit in not only
embracing and applying Rule 10b5-2 but in freely defending the rule’s attack
under Chevron in the wake of the Cuban battle and calling out the precedent
on the fiduciary conundrum with clarifying accuracy and simplicity. There
is no good reason to challenge the rule, which clearly passes Chevron muster
and offers a plausible standard for the relationship giving rise to a duty of
confidence at the core of deception and fraud under Section 10(b) generally.
To ignore Rule 10b5-2 and to only look back again and again to the quagmire
of Powell’s language in Dirks is to willfully dispose of a solution to the
fiduciary conundrum. Unlike McGee II, too many federal courts have done
just that.

III. FIDUCIARY DUTY?
When we think of fiduciary duty, we think generally of one’s positive
obligation to act in the best interest of another (and the negative obligation
not to act in one’s self-interest as it would likely work against the interests
of the fiduciary’s principal or beneficiary).187 The fiduciary relationship
generally derives from some express, implied, formal or informal
relationship that one has accepted or to which one’s willful actions have
equitably given rise. It is often constituted in the principal-agent relationship
where the agent must act in the best interest of the principal, not her own. In
the insider trading context, it is intuitively clear that an officer or director (or
183. Id. (emphasis added).
184. Id. at 317 (citing Proposed Rule, 64 Fed. Reg. at 72,603.)
185. Id.
186. McGee II, 763 F.3d at 317-18.
187. See generally Benjamin J. Richarson, Fiduciary Relationships for Socially Responsible
Investing: A Multinational Perspective, 48 AM. BUS. L.J. 597 (2011) (providing an analysis of fiduciary
relationships, albeit not specific to the securities law context).
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a key informed employee) has a duty to shareholders of the corporation with
which she has such a defined relationship, beyond a duty to the corporate
entity itself.188 Certainly, much state corporate law has been well-developed
statutorily and in state courts to make clear and apply the duties of care and
loyalty comprising such fiduciary relationships.189 The core of the fiduciary
relationship is a one-way duty to act in the best interest of another. This duty
does not address relationships concerning broader, simpler, and often
reciprocal confidentiality, which, notwithstanding the fiduciary conundrum,
are the actual concern of Section 10(b) securities fraud.
One way to solve the fiduciary conundrum in securities fraud is to
jettison any requirement to find a duty of confidence in order to convict or
find liability under Section 10(b). This is Donna Nagy’s suggestion upon
digesting the decreasing role of fiduciary duty in federal securities fraud
cases.190 Nagy views Rule 10b5-2 as “contributing” to the “demise of
fiduciary principles in insider trading.”191
Nagy has argued that courts have inconsistently relied on the fiduciary
based approaches in Chiarella, Dirks, and O’Hagan and that liability under
section 10(b) really turns on wrongful use of confidential information with
or without any fiduciary relationship and associated duty.192 Professor Nagy
is surely correct that “Chiarella, Dirks, and O’Hagan evidence a Supreme
Court willing to stretch fiduciary principles to no small degree, when doing
so facilitates a desirable policy outcome.”193 She is also correct to surmise
that “the Court’s methodology may well have emboldened lower courts to
approach new issues with similar results-oriented reasoning.”194 To resolve
the fiduciary conundrum, Professor Nagy would have us dispose of the focus
on the breach of a duty under Section 10(b) in favor of a focus on the
wrongful obtaining of material inside information.195 However, casting away
this essential element of securities fraud – the basis of fraud or deception –
may be going too far.
Another approach, from Robert Prentice, at least in terms of Section
10(b) violations based on tippee trading, is to return to the temporary insider
approach, or beef up the classical theory of insider trading, even as applied
188. See Nagy, supra note 9, at 1337-38 (for a discussion of minority/majority views on fiduciary
duty and the duty of loyalty).
189. See Prentice, supra note 10, at 360-62 (discussing the inappropriate role of state law on fiduciary
duty in securities fraud in the context of the Cuban case). See generally, Thomas M. Madden, Do
Fiduciary Duties of Managers and Members of Limited Liability Companies Exist as with Majority
Shareholders in Closely Held Corporations, 12 DUQ. BUS. L.J. 211 (2010) (discussing, inter alia, state
law fiduciary standards in corporations outside the context of federal securities fraud).
190. Nagy, supra note 9 at 1340; see also Donna Nagy, Beyond Dirks: Gratuitous Tipping and Insider
Trading, 42 J. CORP. L. 1 passim (2016) (proposing a “fraud on contemporaneous” traders version of
insider trading derived from Burger’s Chiarella dissent).
191. Id. at 1364.
192. Nagy, supra note 9, at 1337. See also Prentice, supra note 10, at 371-2.
193. Nagy, supra note 9, at 1340-41.
194. Id.
195. Id.

56

HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 18:1

to outsiders.196 To his point, Prentice has identified the key part of the
problem he is offering to solve, that “[a]lthough there is technically a
difference between the terms “fiduciary relationship” and “confidential
relationship,” the courts often use these terms interchangeably.”197 This is the
heart of the fiduciary conundrum, a conflating of actually distinguished
terms and meanings.
Alan Strudler and Eric Orts have attempted to sort out the fiduciary
conundrum by promoting a fraud on the investor theory of Section 10(b)
liability grounded in deontological moral theory.198 Their understanding of a
deontological approach centers on the view that causing harm to another
constitutes moral wrong.199 In applying deontology to the fiduciary
conundrum, Strudler and Orts wrote, “[o]n our theory, one has a duty under
the law of fraud to refrain from trading securities on the basis of material
nonpublic information without effectively disclosing the information unless
one has a superior equitable right to the information which may derive from
intelligent analysis, skillful observation, or even luck.”200 This harm
balancing, or calculation of the lesser harm approach, is another alternative,
though it perhaps fails to elucidate the nature of the root duty to be applied
to an insider or outsider trader. Strudler and Orts assert, “[w]e argue that
there are good moral reasons, even in the absence of a fiduciary relationship,
to recognize a duty to disclose in certain circumstances when people with
material nonpublic information trade with those who lack such
information.”201 Ultimately, Strudler and Orts propose that a fraud on the
investor misappropriation theory would most accurately identify those
investors harmed by securities fraud and thus best apply their deontological
moral theory.202 But in arguing that the fraud on the source version of
misappropriation does not depend on a fiduciary relationship and does not
identify a relevant victim of fraud, Strudler and Orts miss the more important
role of confidence. It is the often reciprocal relationship of confidence
captured in Rules 10b5-1 and 10b5-2 that make the fraud on the source
theory work. When confidence is breached, the non-breaching party is
wronged – constituting the essence of the fraud and deceit integral to Section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5.
Other approaches to reforming the law on insider trading include costbenefit analysis, a return to parity-of-information under Cady Roberts,
196. Prentice, supra note 10, at 369 (arguing that the temporary insider approach is preferable even
in the case of a misappropriator).
197. Id. at 374.
198. Strudler and Orts, supra note 9, at 387-88.
199. Id.
200. See Strudler and Orts, supra note 9, at 386.
201. Id. at 380. (emphasis added).
202. Id. at 398-99 (noting that this does not depend upon a fiduciary relationship and expressly
returning to Burger’s Chiarella dissent arguing for the fraud on the investor misappropriation theory and
noting that fraud requires a relevant victim not present in the fraud on the source version of
misappropriation).
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general fairness, property rights analysis, duty to the marketplace and
legislation imposing the same.203
This article contends that the fiduciary conundrum was largely solved
by Rule 10b5-2 twenty years ago, but most federal courts have failed to make
use of it. Rather than explicitly and consistently shifting the duty discussion
under Section 10(b) to one of confidence and eschewing an analysis
premised on fiduciary duty per se, courts have defaulted to the precedent
chain going back to Dirks, if not Chiarella. This has left us with a
“[t]heoretical mess.”204 This, even though Rule 10b5-2 enumerated for us
twenty years ago relationships of “trust or confidence” and obviously left the
fiduciary language by the wayside. One can only conclude that the
Commission’s logical redirection to a duty of confidence has been either
willfully resisted or too often inadvertently ignored by our federal courts.

IV. RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING RULE 10B5-2
The fraud on the source misappropriation theory can just as logically
apply to insiders as to outsiders. Whether the source of the inside information
is a classical insider or an outsider, the duty to the source that would exist
under the classical theory would also exist under this version of the
misappropriation theory. The fraud on the source version of the
misappropriation theory adopted in O’Hagan often finds fraud in the
deception by a tippee trading on material nonpublic information learned
from the source without disclosing the trade to the source.205
Rules 10b5-1 and 10b5-2 were intended to clarify and codify the
misappropriation theory.206 These rules offered a clear and logical shift to
analyze deception in securities fraud cases under a duty of confidence rather
than a confused and inconsistently adhered to fiduciary duty and breach
standard. They offered at least a partial solution to the fiduciary conundrum.
If courts would routinely apply Rule 10b5-2 to insider and outsider trading,
all instances of breach of often reciprocal relationships of confidence would
be covered without the necessity of classical theory verbiage focused on a
fiduciary duty owed to shareholders.
The scenarios that Rule 10b5-2 in its present form cannot address are
those that do not involve established relationships of confidence, whether or
not enumerated under Rule 10b5-2. Such scenarios are of two basic
203. See Jill Fisch, Start Making Sense: An Analysis and Proposal for Insider Trading Regulation, 26
GA. L. REV. 179, 219-238 (1992) (reviewing past approaches to insider trading and proposing legislation
imposing a duty to the market). See also, Jill Fisch, Constructive Ambiguity and Judicial Development
of Insider Trading, 71 SMU L. REV. 750 (2018) (arguing apparently to the contrary of the preceding for
the benefits of judge made law via the concept of constructive ambiguity), and Epstein, Returning to
Common-Law Principles of Insider Trading After United States v. Newman, 125 YALE L.J. 1482 (2016)
(ultimately asserting a market efficiency motive for insider trading and advocating a diminished role for
SEC oversight).
204. Strudler and Orts, supra note 7, at 379.
205. See, e.g., Lyon, 605 F.2d at 548.
206. 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.10b5-1 to 10b5-2.
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paradigms:207 The first exists where a trader misappropriates or steals
material nonpublic information from a source with whom he lacks an
established relationship of confidence. The second exists where, without
deception, a trader receives, happens upon, or finds material nonpublic
information from a source with whom he lacks an established relationship of
confidence. The former we should care about and redress. The latter we
should not. There is no good reason that an innocent finder should be
prohibited from, or punished for, profiting on good luck and her own willing
risk.
John Coffee has opined that “the current reach of the insider trading
prohibition is both arbitrary and incomplete. Egregious cases of
informational misuse are not covered, while less culpable instances of abuse
are criminalized. For the long term, the scope of the insider trading
prohibition needs to be better rationalized.”208 Coffee went on to propose
Rules 10b5-3 and 10b5-4 to address the scenarios of theft and finding
described above.209 Coffee views his proposal in part as the codification of
Dorozhko (finding deception under Section 10(b) without fiduciary duty) in
the same vein that the SEC promulgated Rules 10b5-1 and 10b5-2, with clear
Chevron deference.210
Coffee’s solution generally makes sense. At the same time, however, it
circumvents the essential characteristic of securities fraud, the relationship
of confidence. The fiduciary conundrum has been so perplexing because,
even as courts have mistermed, misinterpreted, and misapplied the nature of
the often reciprocal relationship of confidence, they have been right to attend
to it as an essential element of securities fraud.
Misappropriation or theft of material nonpublic information from
someone with whom the misappropriator or thief has an established
relationship of confidence is presently covered under the existing framework
of Rule 10b5-2. It need only be consistently applied. Because a finder
situation involves no relationship of confidence, it entails no duty nor breach
of duty and no misappropriation or theft, so any trading benefit obtained by
an innocent finder need not be redressed under Section 10(b). In such an
instance, there simply would be no instance of fraud or deceit. It is only in
situations where such a theft occurs outside of an established relationship of
confidence that the current securities fraud framework of Rule 10b5-2 cannot
offer redress.
Coffee is right in his proposed rules discussion and analysis of
Dorozhko—the deception captured under Section 10(b) is broader than
causing one to believe what is false or disbelieve what is true.211 Deception,
indeed, more generally entails trickery or “intentionally misleading by
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.

Coffee, supra note 10, at 300.
Id. at 285.
Id. at 304-8.
Id. at 308.
Id.
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falsehood spoken or acted.”212 So, too, fraud broadly includes cheating.213
Note, also, that Coffee sees agency as the source of a duty of confidentiality,
the breach of which is the heart of securities fraud, not the duty and breach
of formal fiduciary duty per se.214 Indeed, the duty of confidence is not
synonymous with the fiduciary obligation to act in the best interest of
another. Coffee’s discussion supports this article’s reading of an often
reciprocal relationship of confidence being the correct focus in securities
fraud— the focus that can resolve the fiduciary conundrum.
A broader notion of fraud and deceit can be captured and promulgated
by the Commission in modifying existing Rule 10b5-2 to incorporate a
proper understanding of the theft of material nonpublic information. Of
course, the underlying wrongdoing of misappropriation is the unauthorized
use of another’s property.215 Under the misappropriation theory of securities
fraud, that “property” is generally material nonpublic information that would
affect stock price. Theft is the fraudulent taking of another’s property.216 We
need not go deep into property law analysis to incorporate instances of theft
(incorporating the misappropriation of material nonpublic information)
between or among parties lacking established relationships of confidence in
order to sufficiently revise Rule 10b5-2 to capture such theft outside of
relationships of confidence, such as in Dorozhko. We can simply add the
following to the existing Rule 10b5-2.
(c) where, notwithstanding the forgoing, a person willfully obtains
material nonpublic information without consent; i.e. by theft, and that
person knows or should know that the information is material and
nonpublic, such theft shall constitute both (i) “fraud or deceit” and (ii) a
constructive breach of a duty of trust or confidence.

This modification is true to the spirit and meaning of fraud, deceit,
misappropriation, and theft. It will give courts a robust tool codified in Rules
10b5-1 and 10b5-2 as proposed to fully, clearly, and consistently solve the
fiduciary conundrum. Indeed, theft includes the notion of fraud as well as the
taking or use of property without consent. Liability under this addition to
Rule 10b5-2 would, of course, still depend upon the thief’s use of the stolen
information in connection with the purchase and sale of securities. The “in
connection with” component only strengthens the understanding of theft as
essentially a form of fraud that breaches a constructive trust because it entails
the knowing use of the information for personal benefit. Similar to Coffee’s
212. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 406 (6th ed. 1990) (emphasis added).
213. Id. at 660 (“A generic term. Embracing all multifarious means which human ingenuity can
devise, and which are resorted to by one individual to get advantage over another by false suggestions or
by suppression of truth, and includes all surprise, trick, cunning, dissembling, and any unfair way by
which another is cheated.”) (emphasis added).
214. Coffee, supra note 10, at 309-10.
215. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY at 998.
216. Id. at 1477 (emphasis added).
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proposed Rules 10b5-3 and 10b5-4, this modification of Rule 10b5-2 to
include a subpart (c), supra, can be properly accomplished by the
Commission in accord with Chevron deference. It would fill a gap in the
existing rules. More importantly, it would provide a solution to the otherwise
still expanding fiduciary conundrum. It only requires our federal courts to
fully apply a modified Rule 10b5-2 to all instances of alleged securities fraud
where securities trades are made based upon material nonpublic information
obtained via relationships of confidence which are breached. Under the
proposed modified rule 10b5-2, those relationships may be established,
enumerated, or constructively constituted in the act of one willfully taking
the information from another without consent.
This approach would cover all instances of securities fraud foreseeable
under Section 10(b), except where material nonpublic information is
willingly given to and traded upon by an unknowing tippee. In that instance,
the tippee would be akin to a finder and only the tipper would be liable
because the tipper would be willfully breaching his duty of confidence to the
information source. The modified rule would cover (i) a party breaching a
relationship of confidence to an original source of material nonpublic
information, and (ii) a party taking material nonpublic information without
consent, which, though facts and circumstances will of course vary, spans
the other actionable scenarios of Section 10(b) liability.

